Introduction
For many straightforward medical problems any well trained doctor will make a good decision. Sometimes the correct course of action is unclear, however, and without help doctors and patients may make poor decisions because of a failure to consider probabilities correctly or to recognise the range of patients' values and weigh these correctly. Wrong decisions are made as a result of well recognised biases,' and one way of avoiding these biases and clarifying the problem is decision analysis.2 I Decision analysis is a method for breaking complex problems down into manageable component parts, analysing these parts in detail, and then combining them in a logical way to indicate the best course of action. In North America decision analysis is taught in most undergraduate medical courses but it is rarely used in the United Kingdom and was omitted from a BMJ series on logic in medicine in 1987. 4 With more emphasis than ever before being put on patient choice in the NHS the time is ripe for a change of heart on decision analysis and we hope to go some way to remedy this national neglect in this article. blackjack) has wondered when they are dealt, say, a 10 and a seven whether they should stick (remain with their two cards) or twist (buy another card). At any particular stage of the game the probability of victory with a score of 17 is known to the expert. Drawing another card may improve the odds of success but runs the risk of total loss by pushing the score over 21 . In some versions of the game twisting may increase the stake and the potential winnings.
A typical medical problem is similar. Consider a doctor and a patient who have a choice between continuing with a current treatment with a known cure rate or performing a risky procedure which may improve the cure rate but which carries a risk of immediate death. The correct course of action depends on the probabilities (the cure rates and risks of the operation) and the values placed on the possible outcomes. In medicine tests may be available to revise risks, but usually these will also have some This information enabled us to calculate the treatment with the lowest expected mortality. For our patient this was 0-02 with no further treatment and 0-015 (0-005+(0-02X0 5)) with radical hysterectomy. This does not, however, mean that radical hysterectomy is the best treatment because we have not considered all relevant factors-for example, the patient's preference for delayed death from cancer versus immediate death from surgery, the desire to avoid the morbidity of surgery, and above all the desire to conserve fertility. We need to measure the utilities of the outcomes in a way that will allow us to see what chance of one favoured outcome our patient will relinquish to obtain another favoured outcome. When we have such a measure we can combine these utilities with the probabilities in a logical fashion to calculate the treatment with the highest expected utility.
Measurement of utilities
The best method for measuring people's utilities is the basic reference lottery where the relative utilities of three health states are worked out together. Years of life expectancy is another frequently used underlying scale, but people tend to value the years immediately ahead more highly than those far in the
The non-linearity of monetary and life expectancy scales makes it impossible to use them without adjustment to calculate expected utilities in decision analysis. Either basic reference lotteries must be performed to measure the relevant utilities directly or utility curves for the relevant patient or population of patients must be derived from monetary or life expectancy lotteries.
Adding utilities to the decision analysis
Having measured the utilities we need to combine them with the probabilities to select a preferred course of action-that is, that with the greatest expected utility. We start by estimating the utility of each chance node, which is calculated as the weighted average of the utilities of its possible outcomes, where the weights are the probabilities of each outcome. The utility of the upper chance node in figure 5 The difference in expected utility between the different courses of action may not appear very great, but on this scale the difference 0 045 represents 4 5% of the value of the patient's entire life in full health. Moreover, if the axioms of expected utility theory are accepted by our patient (most people do agree that this is how they wish to make decisions), and if the probability and value estimates are the best possible, then it would be perverse to choose the course of lower utility, however small the difference.
Sensitivity analyses
The final part of a full decision analysis should include a sensitivity analysis, because conclusions depend on the probabilities and utilities used, and in real life we are rarely, if ever, certain what these are. In a sensitivity analysis each of the key probabilities and values is varied in turn within the range of reasonable uncertainty to test the robustness of the conclusion. Figure 6 shows a one way sensitivity analysis to show the effect of varying the utility of infertility. Each straight line on the graph represents the expected utility of the relevant strategy at a range of levels of infertility utility. The strategy lines intersect at an infertility utility of 0-995; therefore above this value radical surgery is the preferred option while below it no further surgery is preferred. The point at which strategy lines intersect is called a decision threshold. This threshold will itself vary if other variables such as operative mortality and recurrence risk are changed. The effect of changing more than one variable can be shown in a threshold analysis (fig 7) . Here the decision threshold is plotted against the risk of recurrence and utility of infertility for three different operative death rates. For each patient the utility of infertility and probability of disease spread is plotted. If this point falls below and to the left of the relevant threshold line she should not undergo surgery and if above and to the right she should. The effect of varying utilities and probabilities can be seen at a glance. Decision trees and sensitivity and threshold analyses can easily become complicated and so computerised aids are widely used by serious practitioners.' In this example our conclusions were very sensitive to the value placed on retaining fertility. Doctors should therefore take great care to explore this particular issue with a patient. The example was inspired by a debate about the histological diagnosis of so called "microinvasive cancer." The analysis shows how treatment can be tailored to individual patients according to a range of histological and other criteria and that any attempt to treat patients according to fixed cut off criteria for histological diagnosis is doomed to failure. Decision analysis is seldom used in its full rigour for the treatment of individual patients. More often it helps to structure debate, and it has been used to shed light on some important medical controversies. Some examples are listed in the box. Decision analysis has also been used for some novel purposes, such as the design of randomised controlled trials, 22 problems."4 It is closely allied to cost-utility studies used for resource allocation decisions.
Why prefer decision analysis to global decision making?
The extreme alternative to formal decision analysis is for doctors and patients to decide by intuition and to make a single global analysis of the whole problem. People deciding this way often make suboptimal decisions. These may result from inadequate data, and decision analysis cannot help here except to indicate the need for careful review of the evidence.
Ideally each probability estimate used in making a decision should be derived from published data; in the case of occult cervical tumours we found many relevant articles. Ideally the results from large randomised controlled studies should be used and they should be combined using formal techniques such as metaanalysis. 22 Often such studies are unavailable, and even when they are judgment is required to extrapolate results from one time and place to another. Semiobjective probability estimates often have to be used in which probabilities obtained from published data are modified according to local circumstances or changes in practice. For example, we adjusted the published estimate of operative mortality for occult cervical cancer downwards to take account of improvements in surgical technique, anaesthetics, and intensive care since the studies were undertaken. One of the most common and least justified criticisms of decision analysis is that the need to make such revisions of probability estimates invalidates the technique. These adjustments invalidate decision analysis no more than they do conventional intuitive decision making. The latter is also based on probabilities, which are no more accurate for not being made explicit. Indeed, the process of making probabilities explicit is a reason to use rather than abandon decision analysis, since this exercise exposes the source of disagreement about treatment policy. Because it is transparent, decision analysis encourages a comprehensive review of published data.
Probabilities also need to be adjusted for individual patients in the light of specific test results; the probability of an event is often based not on one but on many items of information. The usual technique for working out the probability of an event, by combining prior probability (prevalence) and the result of all these tests, is Bayes's theorem. The archetypal example of the use of Bayes's theorem in clinical medicine is in the diagnosis of abdominal pain described by de Dombal in 1972 . ' There is evidence that this method improves clinical care by reducing delay in the surgical treatment of gangrenous organs while at the same time reducing the number of negative laparotomies.26 The probabilities of different diagnoses produced in this way are eminently suitable for including in decision trees and hence for decision analysis.
In the absence of data from meta-analysis of good trials and correct Bayesian revision of risks humans use a number of heuristics (systems of reasoning) to estimate subjective probabilities. These often lead to predictable and well recognised biases.' For example, we often estimate the frequency of an event from its ease of recall. Vivid and recent events are overestimated as a result. A surgeon who has just had a death from treatment complications and a patient whose friend died postoperatively will both overestimate treatment risks. Another heuristic is to use the degree of similarity of a pattern of observations to an event to estimate the likelihood of that event. For example, if an unknown fruit looks like an apple it probably is an apple, but if the fruit comes from a country where apples do not grow-that is, the prior odds of it being an apple are low-the "representativeness" heuristic will lead to an overestimate. Finally the "anchoring" heuristic describes the way in which people typically make a prior estimate of an event occurring. When further information becomes available they adjust this prior risk upwards 
Conclusion
The language and methods of decision analysis and more specifically of expected utility theory can change how we think. The discovery that there is a specific mathematical function (expected utility) which measures the benefits of a course of action is a revelation to many when they first come across it. We hope that this article inspires some practitioners. Decision analysis has been widely used in business for years and has entered the mainstream ofmedical thinking in North America and more recently Australia and New Zealand. It is incorporated in the medical curriculum in centres as far apart as Hamilton, Ontario, and Dunedin in the South Island of New Zealand. We believe that doctors in Europe may love it or hate it but cannot ignore it.
